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International transfer pricing in business, 
economics, and teaching
INAUGURAL LECTURE
held at the acceptance of the position 
o f professor in quantitative economics 
at the University of Maastricht 
on Friday 21 November, 1997
by
Dr. Dr. Thorsten Broecker
rgtlbWOcZb^él
Ur x^x ï^itsiHblicraiask 
Ur&ordteit Mc&stricht
Dear Rector,
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is my honour and pleasure to be able to teach at the University of Maastricht on the 
subject of International Transfer Pricing. Therefore, today, I would like to explore with 
you this topic of international transfer pricing and its role in business, economics, and 
teaching.
International transfer pricing deals with the valuation of transfers of goods, services and 
intangibles between the afïiliated companies of a multinational enterprise. It determines 
largely the distribution of profits amongst the group companies and therefore the tax 
returns in their host countries. With the globalization of the economy and of individual 
companies, this issue has become a focus of attention for the OECD member states, 
amongst them The Netherlands, and in 1995 new OECD Guidelines were published on 
international transfer pricing. This indicates that countries and multinational enterprises 
alike recognize the increased importance of transfer pricing.
International transfer pricing is furthermore a truly interdisciplinary subject, in that it 
requires an economie and business interpretation of the law and the political objectives 
behind it. Still, I believe that there are areas, which are interesting from an economics and 
business perspective, but which have not yet attracted the academic interest they deserve. 
I do hope that my speech will further stimulate and foster interdisciplinary work on this 
subject.
For nearly the same reasons, courses on international transfer pricing provide substantial 
educational benefits for students in economics and business administration and law. In 
fact, insights and tools will help them in their professional careers.
For my own person, I see my work at the University of Maastricht as a complement to 
my work as a management consultant on, amongst other financial subjects, solving
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international transfer pricing issues for multinational enterprises. It is an opportunity for 
me to take a look at the broader picture. I will do this today in my speech where I want to 
present my personal views and thoughts on the economie principles and their application 
in international transfer pricing. Despite having worked a substantial portion of my career 
in this area, I am still fascinated by the subject. And I hope that you will share my interest 
in international transfer pricing after my speech.
International transfer pricing bas gained in importance for multinational 
enterprises
There are substantial cross-border transaction flows between the members of a 
multinational enterprise
International transfer pricing is first of all an issue that arises for multinational 
enterprises. It addresses the question of how to properly price transactions between the 
affiliated companies of the multinational enterprise which are located in different 
countries.
Let me give you an example: you buy a computer in The Netherlands. This type of 
computer, however, may have been technically designed in the US, assembled in the UK, 
with components coming from even other countries. All companies involved may belong 
to the same multinational enterprise. So what should these companies get for their share 
o f design, manufacturing and marketing work they contributed to the computer you 
bought, and what is a fair share of the tax returns for each of the host countries?
This clearly depends on many factors, one of which is the international structure of the 
group's value added activities and its transaction flows. Multinational enterprises 
optimize their resource structure when operating in geographical regions or on a global 
scale, whilst optimally serving the individual markets. This has consequences for their
research and development, production and distribution network. Typically, on a regional 
basis, research and development for a specific product is concentrated in one location, the 
production of semi-fïnished goods and finished goods is carried out in a few locations, 
and sales and marketing companies are established in every local market. Furthermore, all 
these entities may be supported by shared service centres, which provide support to the 
operating units for accounting, treasury, human resources or other functions. This 
resource structure and the distribution o f the value added activities in the multinational 
enterprise is determined, for example, by considerations of factor costs, logistics, the 
availability of a skilled labour force, and the exploitation of economies of integration.
Not surprisingly, there are substantial cross-border transaction flows between the entities 
of the multinational enterprise. Semi-finished goods flow from their production locations 
to the production locations of finished goods. They in turn are shipped to the sales and 
marketing companies. But it is not only the transfer o f tangible goods within the 
multinational enterprise that is important. Equally important are transfers of intangibles 
and services. An example of an intangible is the result of product or process development, 
that is made available by the research and development centre to the production units. 
Other examples are marketing intangibles, e.g. trade or brand names that are often 
developed centrally but used by all the local sales companies. For every Guilder of sales 
to the customers of the multinational enterprise, 50 Cents o f inter-company transactions 
might easily be incurred.
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The cross-border transactions within a multinational enterprise create a tax problem
Clearly all these intra-group transactions between the entities of the multinational 
enterprise have to be priced. Unless these transfer prices are used to provide the right 
incentives in a profit centre organization, a topic which I do not want to pursue here, they 
are not directly important for the multinational enterprise. The transfer prices merely 
affect the distribution of the group's operating profit amongst its entities but not its 
overall level. This is the reason why some people refer to transfer prices as “wooden 
dollars” or shifting money from one pocket to another.
Transfer prices create, however, a tax problem precisely because of their effect on the 
distribution of the group's operating profit amongst its entities. Obviously, if the transfer 
price for goods, services or intangibles is set higher, then the selling entity will receive a 
higher portion o f the entire operating profit and the buying entity will receive a smaller
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portion. This in tum affects the tax income that each of the host countries receives firom 
the operation of the multinational enterprise.
Tax authorities are therefore concemed that they do not receive a fair share of the group's 
taxable income. The primary issue is not even that multinational enterprises deliberately 
use their transfer pricing to exploit the tax differentials between the various countries. 
According to my experience, tax efficiency is one amongst many other and often more 
important factors that drive investment and resource allocation decisions. Rather, because 
of its relatively low importance, transfer pricing does not receive the necessary attention 
which can lead to distortions in the distribution of profits. This is the reason why tax 
authorities are allowed to adjust transfer prices and tax the resulting profits even if tax 
avoidance is not intended.
Actual 
transfer price
Assessed 
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Tax adjustment
Seller Buyer
Tax adjustment due to transfer price adjustment
The tax authorities have recognized that the investigation o f transfer pricing is becoming 
an important source of tax revenues. This emanates also from the recent publication of
!the US Regulations and the OECD Guidelines on international transfer pricing in 1995 
and the controversial debates about the principles o f international transfer pricing and its 
interpretations.
f Today we are in a situation of increased awareness about transfer pricing problems,
higher sophistication of methods and data analysis, and an ever increasing importance of 
r multinational enterprises for international transactions.
In this situation, multinational enterprises face the task of designing and implementing 
transfer pricing systems that are tax acceptable to avoid costly litigation or even double 
taxation. Such a system has to be tailored to the enterprise's strategy and structure. More 
precisely, the transfer pricing system has to properly reflect the functions carried out, the 
assets and resources employed and the risks taken by the group companies involved in 
these intercompany transactions. This is the reason why, in addition to legal 
considerations, business reasoning and the application of economic principles and tools 
come into play.
Economic and business principles underlie the approaches in international transfer 
pricing
The govemine principle in international transfer pricing is the arm's leneth Standard
I In this section, I want to outline which economic principles underlie today's approaches
! to international transfer pricing. The starting point for this discussion is the
j intemationally accepted A rm 's Length Standard, which sets out under which conditions
f a transfer pricing system is tax acceptable. The US Regulations on transfer pricing
provide a very concise definition:
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Under the arm 's length Standard controlled taxpayers are expected to realize 
from their controlled transactions the results that would have been realized if 
uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transactions under the same 
circumstances.
The questions of comparabilitv and comparabilitv adiustments arise
This defmition of the arm's length Standard raises certain questions: What is meant by
“result”, and how can it be measured? This leads to the various possible transfer pricing
methods. The typical methods for transactions of tangible property are:
• Comparable uncontrolled price method which compares the transfer price directly 
with raarket prices,
• Resale price method which compares a controlled taxpayer's gross margin, i.e. the 
difierence between net sales and cost of sales expressed as percentage of sales, with 
the gross margins of other companies,
• Cost plus method, which compares the taxpayer's markup on cost with those of other 
companies,
• Transactional net margin method, which compares the taxpayer's net margin with 
those of other companies. This method can be applied in connection with the resale 
price or the cost plus logic.
• Profit split method, which splits the Consolidated profit of the multinational enterprise 
that is related to the specific intercompany transactions under consideration according 
to the contribution of each party to the group's success.
The typical transfer pricing methods for the transfer of intangibles are:
• Licensing, where the licensor receives an income from the licensee for allowing the 
licensee to exploit proprietary product, process or marketing intangibles. Under 
licensing, one can, for example, compare the licensing agreement and the royalty rate 
in the controlled transaction with those in uncontrolled transactions between 
independent parties. Or, one can apply the profit split method that splits the
Consolidated profit Irom using the intangible and determines the royalty as that 
portion of the total profit that accrues to the licensor.
• Cost sharing, where the cost sharing parties fund the development of the intangible 
and bear the potential risk of failure of the development
The second question is: How can one identify and analyze “same transactions under the 
same circumstances”? And more importantly: If there are differences in the transactions 
and the circumstances how can one properly account for these differences? These 
questions lead to the subject of benchmarking where one has to determine broad 
comparability criteria and carry out comparability adjustments to eliminate distorting 
impacts of differences between the transaction of the controlled taxpayer and the 
transactions between independent companies that are used as a reference.
Suppose for example that a product that is sold between afïiliated companies does not 
carry a brand name. There are physically almost identical products also sold between 
independent companies. If they are branded, a direct price comparison is hardly possible, 
because one cannot determine the effect of the brand names on their prices. If, however, 
none of the products is branded but if there are only differences in sales volume, then it 
might be possible to determine volume discounts and eliminate the distorting impact on 
the price. The first example leads to the comparability requirement that the products used 
for a direct price comparison should not carry marketing intangibles. The second case 
provides an example for a comparability adjustment.
It is worth noting that this problem might become unimportant if a different transfer 
pricing method is used. If, for example, the dependent buyers and resellers perform the 
same functions as the independent buyers and resellers, then one would expect that they 
eam the same distribution margin regardless of the product differences. The application 
of the resale price method might then be appropriate.
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The arm's length Standard prescribes a test, and, as a matter of fact. a difficult one
Let me please emphasize that the arm's length Standard describes the principles of a test. 
To prove that intercompany transfer pricing is arm's length and therefore tax acceptable, 
one basically has to demonstrate that the same prices, gross or net margins would be 
realized if these transactions occurred between independent parties. With the exception of 
the profit split method (at least partly) and the cost sharing method, all transfer pricing 
methods refer to the world outside the multinational enterprise. This is why besides 
“comparables analysis” some people talk about “outside evidence”. The ultimate arm's 
length test is an economic one founded in reality.
After this conceptual introduction, I would like to explain the arm's length Standard and 
the practical problems associated with it in an unusual way by using an exam question 
from my last course:
“Yourfather wants to treatyou as a fully grown-up person and starts to charge 
yóu 800 Guilders fo r  your little room in your parent 's house. You believe that this 
is much too high. On the other hand you would like to stay at home and enjoy the 
family lifeyou have been enjoyingfor the last 40 years. Having recently attended 
the course on international transfer pricing you want to establish a truly arm 's 
length price.
This little example exhibits all the features that occur in transfer pricing for multinational 
enterprises. First of all it is a non-arm's length situation. There are probably not many 
families that have strangers participate in all aspects of the family life. Still the task is to 
determine market valuations and prices for the goods, services and intangibles received in 
this family relationship. The starting point is to determine the goods and services 
received. The list is fairly extensive and comprises letting the room itself, cooking meals, 
the laundry, access to cable TV, water and heating and many more items. There might 
even be services provided for which the father wants to charge money but from which the
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son or daughter does not receive any benefits. The next step is to quantify the volume of 
these transactions, e.g. how much living space, how much heating, or how many meals 
are provided.
These goods and services have to be priced now. In some cases, like the use of the 
telephone, charging the direct cost for calls is clearly appropriate. The recovery of the 
fixed cost already poses a problem, because the student would have to cover that in its 
entirety if  he had his own phone. The pricing of meals with reference to the university's 
dining hall or outside restaurants will require comparability in terms of timeliness, quality 
and quantity. If this is not possible one might attempt to build up a cost chain for material 
and labor and add an appropriate profit markup. This decomposition of the problem leads 
to the questions of how to quantify the components properly reflecting the circumstances 
of receiving that service. To determine an arm's length rent for the room itself one has to 
identify comparable accommodation. Space, access to garden, closeness to the university 
and many other factors determine comparability.
Clearly, this case is not meant seriously, in particular, the student's age is not 
representative. The problem posed is, however, a non-trivial one. There are numerous 
goods and services provided, some of them interlinked. Various methods can be used, 
both cost-based and market price-based methods. Issues of cost allocation and the use of 
full versus marginal cost arises. When applying market-based methods, one has to ensure 
comparability of the arm's length transaction with the family situation. If this is not 
entirely possible, one has to determine the effect o f any differences on the price to be 
charged. I would like to invite you to think about this example at your leisure. It has some 
surprises in store.
Let me please come back to the situation of a multinational enterprise and the general 
economie principles underlying transfer pricing methods. Consider the extremely simple 
situation where one group member develops and produces a high-tech product. It sells its 
products to afïïliated sales companies of the multinational enterprise which in tum resell
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it to non-affiliated retaiiers or end-customers. Because of the technological contents, the 
product will be unique and it will be impossible to find comparable market prices, as was 
also argued above for the branded products. For the same reason it will not be appropriate 
to compare the developing and manufacturing company's profit or cost markup with 
those of independent manufacturers. The most appropriate and most reliable test of the 
arm's length Standard is to apply the resale price method and to compare the affiliated 
companies’ distribution margin with that of independent companies. If, on the other hand, 
the product is low-tech and the sales company adds the intangible in form of a brand 
name, perhaps then the test of the manufacturing company is the preferred approach.
The selection of the tested party and the transfer pricine method to be applied is driven by 
the economic ownership of intangibles
Obviously the choice between the affiliated companies to be tested and the various 
transfer pHcing methods is crucial in terms of application and results. This important 
choice is driven by the allocation of the intangibles, and more generally the functions 
performed, risks taken and assets employed in the multinational enterprise. I tend to 
believe that the questions of who in the group owns the intangibles, how to determine the 
ownership, and how to deal with the transfer pricing consequences is the single most 
important economic issue in transfer pricing.
In fact, when transfer pricing practitioners refer to the ownership of intangibles within a 
multinational enterprise they seldomly refer to legal ownership but rather to “economic 
ownership”. Economic ownership focuses on which party actually incurred the costs and 
the ex ante risks for developing the intangibles. This is being made explicit for cost 
sharing agreements. In cost sharing agreements two or more parties share the funding of, 
for example, the research and development work. If the research and development fails, 
they lose their money. Because they share the costs and ex ante risks they all become the 
economic owners of the developed intangibles and are entitled to the profits from 
exploiting those intangibles, even though only one of them might be the legal owner.
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The same approach to economie ownership of intangibles is also applicable in other 
areas, for example, for marketing intangibles. Practically speaking, it is, however, very 
difficult to determine who the economie owner is. In fact, this in tum might depend on 
the transfer pricing system. In our example the manufacturer could choose to refund the 
sales companies’ marketing efforts through the transfer price. If the sales company fails 
to raise prices or volume (and therefore ultimately group profit) through its marketing 
effort in a sustainable way, it might still eam an appropriate distribution margin. In this 
case the manufacturing company effectively absorbs the risk of the unsuccessful 
marketing effort. If the development of the marketing intangible is successful, the 
manufacturing company would also obtain the pro fits because the transfer price would 
rise with the sales of the sales company. Whether failure or success, the sales company 
would still only eam a normal margin, whereas the manufacturer incurs the risk and is 
entitled to the resulting extra profïts or otherwise.
This is also an interesting example of how multinational enterprises can structure the 
allocation of intangibles amongst the group companies through transfer prices. 
Furthermore, a consistency requirement arises: transfer pricing determines the ownership 
of intangibles, which in tum drives transfer pricing, for example through the choice of the 
selected transfer pricing method.
In international transfer pricing. the paradiem of price formation is represented bv the 
l profit split mèthod^which determines the transfer price based on the level of intangibles 
economicallv owned bv the parties involved in the transaction
The issue of economic ownership of intangibles and their economic treatment goes even a 
step further. If  in our example of a multinational enterprise both sides have important 
intangibles, e.g. product and marketing intangibles, then neither the manufacturer nor the 
sales company can be tested alone. This is precisely the case where the profit split method 
applies. The Consolidated profit of the entire group is split according to the relative
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contributions each party makes to the overall success of the group. These relative 
contributions to the overall success in tum depend on the intangibles involved. It is often 
impossible to properly value these intangibles. Instead one can capitalize the expenses 
and determine an intangible asset. The Consolidated profït is now split according to the 
intangible Capital of each party. Admittedly, this is only an approximation. It is based on 
the view that the development of intangibles is an investment that requires a return.
Transfer^
prite
Cost
Profit
Profit
Cost
Split in 
proportion to 
intangible capital
Functional, Split of 
normal or residual 
routine profit profit
Residual profit split between an ajfiliated seller and buyer
Let me describe the profit split logic more bluntly. Imagine a double branded product, for 
the sake of the argument imagine an IBM computer with an Intel chip. The entire 
computer with the chip is sold for a certain price in the marketplace. But what is the price 
that Intel charges for the chip and that IBM in our example is willing to pay? The profit 
split logic says that the price for the chip is such that both IBM and Intel would eam the 
same return on their respective investments.
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There is some intuitive appeal to it, but from a conceptual standpoint this is not quite 
satisfactory. One issue is that investment decisions are based on expectations of a return 
on that investment, an expectation which might not be fulfilled in the end. Also the 
assumption that both intangibles implicitly own the same retum is questionable in the 
light that they might represent different risks and have different gestation periods and 
economic lives.
But let me come back to the issue o f the allocation of intangibles between the group 
companies and what this means for the interpretation of the transfer pricing methods. 
Consider again the initial example, where the sales company does not own intangibles 
and acts as an agent on behalf o f the developing and manufacturing company. Then the 
sales company has no substantial impact on the group's overall success, which is largely 
determined by the intangibles created by the developing and manufacturing company. It 
is this company who is the entrepreneur in the group whereas the sales company performs 
routine functions. As a consequence, we have argued that the sales company should 
receive a normal distribution margin, which leaves the opportunity for entrepreneurial 
profits (and losses) with the manufacturen The same result emerges when applying the 
profit split logic, because the sales company has no intangibles and is therefore only 
entitled to a normal or routine profit.
This argument indicates that the profit split expresses the general economic principle that 
is used in transfer pricing to explain the formation of prices. If in our simple example of a 
multinational enterprise the manufacturer has no intangibles the transfer price would be 
very low, just allowing the manufacturer to eam a normal retum on its capital employed. 
If then the portion of intangibles that is owned by the manufacturer increases, also the 
transfer price increases, up to the limit where the manufacturer owns all the intangibles 
and where now the sales company is allowed to eam only a normal retum on its business. 
I am not entirely convinced that this logic is familiar to all practitioners and it was 
therefore an interesting topic for a masters thesis. %
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Although the price formation between independent parties is based on expectations. this 
does not preclude takine an ex post standpoint
Price formation between independent companies in general and also based on the profit 
split logic in particular is likely to be based on expectations. On the other hand, the test of 
the arm's length nature of transfer prices can often not be carried out with reference to the 
expectations of the companies involved. This creates tension between ex ante 
expectations and ex post results which therefore leads to a very interesting and important 
debate in international transfer pricing. It appears that there are two schools of thought. 
One school focuses on the result: Is the price, gross margin or net margin that was 
realized in the controlled transaction the same as the price, gross margin or net margin 
that was realized in the comparable independent transactions? The other school of 
thought argues that not the result matters so much but rather, how the controlled 
transaction was structured. If it was structured in the same way that independent 
companies would structure their transaction, the transaction is arm's length. This 
standpoint is supplemented by the argument that everybody has to determine transfer 
prices in advance and that everybody has to stick to the initial contracts. Whereas the first 
school would calculate profit splits on an ex post basis, the second school would 
determine the transfer price based on the expected results of the profit split and then 
freeze the transfer prices for the years to come.
Clearly, both positions have their merit. Personally, I am in favor of taking the ex post 
view. First o f all there is a very simple, practical reason. It is much easier to determine the 
actual results of controlled and uncontrolled transactions than to establish that both are 
based on the same contractual arrangements. Secondly, there are examples where 
independent companies renegotiate contracts or where they negotiate contracts for the 
fïiture which gives one party at least a partial compensation for shortcomings in past 
performance.
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But there is a more fundamental reason from my perspective, which in fact stems from 
the arm's length Standard itself. The arm's length Standard asks what the outcome would 
have been if independent parties had done business under the same conditions and 
circumstances as the members of the multinational enterprise. Now, affiliated companies 
have more possibilities of how to structure their relationship. For example they share 
profit & loss and balance sheet data. They have common and integrated budgeting and 
planning processes. In short within the multinational enterprises the transaction costs are 
much lower than between independent companies. This is one element of economies of 
integratiori. Furthermore, multinational enterprises often do not use transfer pricing for 
local performance measure so that transfer pricing has little incentive eflects. For this 
reason, group companies can more easily write contingent contracts. If independent 
companies had the same possibilities they would use that tooi to improve the risk sharing 
between them and the contingent contract would allow ex post price adjustments.
The discussion regarding expectations and actual, ex ante and ex post, has also been 
addressed in court cases on international transfer pricing. Over many years, a sales 
company of a multinational enterprise made low profits and even losses. This situation 
was defended by the company that it is normal business conduct between independent 
parties to honor contracts, and furthermore, that it is normal to incur startup losses. The 
court took an economic standpoint. It was argued that in the case of sales companies the 
exit costs are relatively low. One can therefore expect that an independent and prudent 
businessman would terminate his business rather than incurring low profits or even losses 
over such an extended period of time without any hope for improvement. The court 
concluded that after a certain period of time, an afïïliated sales company should eam a 
positive return.
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There is a verv important link between entrepreneurial risks and the economie ownership 
of intangibles
Such considerations of startup situations are very important in international transfer 
pricing but have not yet been dealt with properly. As demonstrated above the tax 
authorities fear that this argument is used as an excuse for reducing the newly founded 
company's profit. On the other hand, in a business environment, startup losses are 
common. The real underlying issue is again about intangibles. A company starting up its 
business in a market has to develop name recognition, a retail network, educate the local 
labor force, adopt the product to local requirements, or perhaps develop supplier 
relationships and manufacturing processes. One could argue that it has to develop certain 
intangibles to be successful in the market. This is costly and takes time. And it is risky, 
because it may fail as many real life examples show.
In light of our previous arguments, this company becomes the owner of intangibles and 
should be allowed to reap any benefits afterwards. The multinational enterprise may elect 
to structure its intemal relationships in such a way but then it also has to make sure 
through the transfer pricing system that the new company can obtain the retum on its 
investment. However, there is an important difference between an affiliated group of 
companies and independent companies. If the startup fails for an independent company, it 
will go bankrupt. If the same happens to a member of a multinational enterprise, the 
group typically will support it. Effectively, someone else takes over the risk of failure. In 
such a case, who is the true economic owner of the intangibles developed in the new 
market? I anticipate that this kind of discussion will become more and more important 
when multinational enterprises enter developing countries, which then might realize the 
importance of transfer pricing.
I just would like to point out that the multinational enterprise can overcome the above 
problem. Through its transfer pricing system, another company, e.g. the parent company, 
can take over the startup risk and fund the development of the intangibles. The startup
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company itself obtains a routine profit from day one. As a consequence, any additional 
profits generated for the group in this new market should not remain with the startup 
company but with the other affiliated company, which also took over the funding and the 
risk for developing the new market.
The economic ownership and the allocation of entrepreneurial risks are the overriding 
considerations for concept design, choosing the tested partv. and selecting the most 
aporonriate transfer pricing method for testing the arm's length nature of transfer prices
The conceptual discussion so far has important practical implications. The observed 
allocation of intangibles and entrepreneurial risks determines the choice of the tested 
party and the selection of the transfer pricing method. In a nutshell, affiliated companies 
that own major intangibles or incur entrepreneurial risks should be given the 
corresponding opportunity to eam entrepreneurial profits or otherwise. They are typically 
not selected as the tested party. The other companies should eam a normal or routine 
profit in accordance with their own routine functions, risks and assets. This is to be tested 
by applying Standard transfer pricing methods using a comparison of prices, gross 
margins or net margins.
It follows that the allocation of intangibles and risks also drives the design of an 
economically sound transfer pricing system. It should be kept in mind that the 
multinational enterprise has considerable freedom in the allocation of such intangibles 
and risks. It can decide about who funds the development and incurs the ex ante risk and 
therefore becomes the economic owner with a corresponding profit entitlement (not 
guarantee!). It can choose between admissible transfer pricing methods such as licensing 
or cost sharing. In fact, the choice o f the transfer pricing method may impact on the 
economic ownership of intangibles. It goes without saying that these choices have a 
substantial impact on the profit allocation amongst the entities of the multinational 
enterprise.
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I would like to mention as an aside that the allocation of “normal” risks is the second 
most important design feature for a transfer pricing system. There are numerous 
possibilities to structure the risk sharing between the buying and the selling company. A 
firm could just provide a contract service at a risk free profit or be left with some market 
risk and eam a profit that compensates for that risk.
Economic and business loeic is also heavilv used for comparabilitv adiustments
Many of the examples given show that transactions can be structured in different ways. 
Despite the fact that they might be broadly comparable, differences remain that have an 
impact on the resulting prices or margins. To the greatest extent possible, these 
distortions have to be eliminated to arrive at the required reliability o f the application of 
the arm's length Standard.
Consider for example the resale price method, which compares the gross margin of the 
affiliated sales company with that o f independent and broadly comparable independent 
sales companies. Precisely comparable companies will hardly exist so that differences in 
the functions performed, the risks incurred or the assets (including intangible assets) 
employed will remain between the afïiliated sales company and the selected independent 
companies. The affiliated company may not have a warehousing function, whereas the 
independent companies have one, there may be different exposures to exchange rate risks, 
or working capital levels. These differences have an impact on the observed distribution 
margins and lead to an unfair comparison. This is the reason why the arm's length 
Standard requires that the same transactions under the same circumstances be considered. 
Now if it were possible to quantify all these differences and develop appropriate 
adjustment logies for them, then one would arrive at a highly reliable determination of an 
arm's length transfer price.
Without being exhaustive, I just want to mention a few comparability adjustment 
approaches. Differences in inventory levels between the tested party and comparable
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uncontrolled companies lead to differences in the financing requirements. To quantify 
them it is common practice to value the difference in inventory days by using the 
theoretical weighted average cost of Capital (WACC) derived from the Capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM). Regression techniques have also been proven successfbl, when it 
is not possible to derive on theoretical grounds satisfactory relationships between cost or 
margin drivers and the margin itself. Often, statistical analyses even enable the 
determination of the actual cost or margin driver from a set of potential drivers in the first 
place.
The comparabilitv adiustments lead to an arm's length ranee
The purpose o f carrying out comparability adjustments to the comparable parties is to 
match their functional profile as close as possible to that of the tested party. At the same 
time the distorting effects stemming from the differences are eliminated. Still, there will 
be an interval of results, i.e. a range of prices or margins that comparable independent 
parties would realize for similar transactions and under similar circumstances as those of 
the tested party. This is called the arm's length range.
There are two reasons for arriving at intervals rather than a single price as could be 
expected frorn textbook pricing models. One is that the data for carrying out 
comparability adjustments may be incomplete. The other reason is that also in economic 
theory price ranges for a product emerge if the assumption of complete market 
transparency, efficiency and cost free entry and exit is abandoned. Therefore, in reality, 
one would also expect a range of prices negotiated between independent fïrms. •
The question arises o f  how to interpret the arm's length Standard in such a case. Suppose 
that the results in the arm's length are all equally reliable, then there is no reason to 
distinguish amongst the points. It should therefore be argued that the transfer prices 
satisfy the arm's length Standard if  they fall within the range.
21
Gross margin Gross margins of comparable
of afflliated independent companies
company
Range concept fo r  the resale price method
Tbere are still substantial economic issues in international transfer pricing that 
require further discussion
Personally I believe that the arm's length Standard is a very good basis for dealing with 
transfer pricing issues. However, great care should be taken when interpreting it for 
practical applications and we have already looked at some of the underlying economic 
principles, application problems, and, in fact, some conceptual problems. In this section I 
want to go beyond that and address some general economic considerations, because I am 
convinced that economics and business administration can develop policy 
recommendations on how to interpret and apply the arm's length Standard and they can 
also point out its strengths and weaknesses.
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Is the profit split concept reallv a valid price formation mechanism?
I have pointed out that the profit split logic is in my view the most important economic 
paradigm in international transfer pricing. The reason is that it describes a price formation 
mechanism that can and is applied to the transfer of tangible and intangible property. 
According to this logic the transfer price is determined by splitting the Consolidated profit 
of the parties involved in the transaction according to their contribution to the overall 
success, which is in practical terms measured as the portion of the total intangible Capital 
they own individually. If  one of the parties has no such intangible Capital one arrivés back 
at giving that party a normal or routine gross or net margin. In this case of the often 
applied residual profit split method, this leads to the same result as applying the cost plus, 
resale price or transactional net margin methods.
When the profit split method is applied to the transfer o f intangibles, it determines a 
royalty to the licensor that leaves profit with the licensee in accordance with the 
intangible Capital employed by the licensee. If the licensee has none, he has to be 
considered a contract manufacturer, who is only entitled to a normal or routine profit. The 
licensor will then extract the complete rent in the license agreement.
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Concept o f applying the profit split method to licensing
Basically, in the profit split method, the transfer price allows both parties to recover their 
respective costs, to eam a normal profit, and to eam the same retum on their intangible 
assets. This price formation rule has some intuitive appeal, but I think it is at odds with 
Standard economic theory. When making the investment decision, the multinational 
enterprise will consider the investment in, Iets say, the product intangibles and the 
marketing intangibles at the same time. The group will maximize the expected cash flow 
and has to trade off between the investment of an additional Guilder in product design or 
marketing activities. This already points out a number of important differences between 
the theoretical and the practical application. One is that the decision basis is cash flow 
rather than the capitalized and amortized investment amounts. Another one is that the last 
Guilder invested in the product design and the last Guilder invested in marketing have the 
same retum, but the total amounts do not have the same retum. The additional issue of 
expected profits or cash flows versus ex post profits or cash flows might be reconcilable, 
because it has the additional dimension that affiliated companies can write contingent 
contracts which might be difficult for independent companies, as mentioned above.
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There is another important difference. The group's investment decision on product design 
and marketing activities is a joint one and hopefully leads to economies of integration. 
These synergies arise because typically, maximized profit of the group is higher than the 
sum of the individual profit if each company were to maximize its individual profit by a 
standalone investment decision. The profit split suggests to split this profit element that 
arises from the joint investment decision in proportion to the underlying individual 
intangible assets. From an economic perspective this problem is very similar to allocating 
common costs. Using Standard bargaining models, like Rubinstein or Nash Bargaining 
the result is, however, a 50:50 split of this common profit.
Because of the crucial importance of the assumptions on the price formation in 
international transfer pricing, I hope that economic theory will be able to provide sound 
and practical concepts in the fiiture.
A general problem o f price formation mechanisms in international transfer pricing is that 
thev have to exclude incentive effects of market prices between independent firms
Problems arise in the application of the arm's length Standard but also in the development 
of economic models that try to describe the price formation between independent parties 
if  they were in the same situation as affiliated parties. In my view, this is because the 
different purposes of the prices are mixed up. A price first of all values a product sold and 
bought, an intangible, or a service rendered. This is the primary focus in international 
transfer pricing. Between independent parties, prices also provide incentives and, through 
their impact on profits, also influence the firms' management decisions. I agree that this 
distinction between valuation and incentive purposes is artificial because both occur at 
the same time in markets which, by definition, consist of independent players. Valuation 
is indeed partly influenced by incentives. For example, a product price might be set 
relatively low to induce another firm to focus its sales effort on this product.
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However, companies belonging to the same group often use performance measures that 
are not tied to the profit of the individual companies. To put it more drastically the bonus 
o f local management of a multinational enterprise often depends on criteria that relate to 
the entire group's performance rather than merely local profit. Budgeting and reporting 
processes are integrated, and volume, price or sales mix decisions are taken to maximize 
the group's profit rather than that of the individual companies. I would like to 
hypothesize that independent firms in such a situation would determine a different 
transfer price.
Related to the subject o f incentives is the issue of risk sharing between the companies. 
Independent companies probably face a higher bankruptcy risk than affiliated companies, 
simply because the latter are likely to be rescued by their parent company. Or, 
independent companies face the risk of having their contract terminated and being 
replaced by an affiliated company of the group. This is, for example, quite a typical 
approach when developing a market. As a consequence, one would expect that 
independent companies eam a return that covers that risk exposure. It is often impossible 
to quantify this additional profit element and the arm's length Standard still forces a 
comparison of the tested party's return to the independent firm's returns.
International transfer pricing has to strueele with the fact that multinational enterprises 
can structure their transactions differentlv from those o f independent firms
The way multinational enterprises can structure their intemal incentive systems 
differently from the incentive structures between independent parties is one example of 
their greater range of freedom. This clearly also extends to their inter-company 
transactions. Multinational enterprises can and do structure their intra-group transactions 
in a way that would not be chosen between independent companies.
A group perspective is taken to exploit economies of integration, investment decisions, 
product specialization of production units, capacity utilization within a network of
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production locations, and market allocations. There is an enormous exchange of financial 
and operational information, there are common budgeting and reporting processes, 
management personnel is rotated amongst the entities. The multinational enterprise has 
almost complete freedom in how to allocate functions or risks amongst its entities. To 
give a dramatic example, in principle, the afïiliated sales companies of a multinational 
enterprise could firnd the group's research and development. They thereby become the 
economic owners of the developed intangibles, which often represent a critical success 
factor for the group. No enterprise would allow that its independent sales companies 
become the owner of the research and development results.
Another example is that a multinational enterprise splits the sales o f finished goods and 
the aftermarket sales into two separate organizations. If an independent company were 
used instead, it would carry out both functions. There are many more examples o f  where 
the multinational enterprise structures its intra-group transactions in a way different from 
that o f  independent parties. Still the task is to satisfy the arm's length Standard for these 
transactions as they are actually structured by the group, asking and answering the 
question o f  what the outcome would have been had this transaction taken place between 
independent parties. For this purpose, new comparability adjustments may have to be 
designed to capture the allocation o f  functions and risks o f  the affiliated group companies 
and to base the application o f  the arm's length Standard on a series o f  decomposed 
functions and risks.
This freedom in structuring transactions and organizations created an inherent problem in 
the application o f the arm's length Standard. It is not appropriate, in my view, that the tax 
authorities should be allowed to impose any restrictions on the way a multinational 
enterprise can structure its intemal organization, processes, or transactions. Today, this is 
generally accepted in the regulations and is called the “as-actually-structured” principle, 
although the regulations mention exceptions to that rule. Furthermore there is a link back 
to whether to interpret the arm's length Standard from a results ’ viewpoint or whether to 
focus on the structure o f the contractual and commercial relationship.
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There are good reasons whv multinational enterprises exist and therefore. there are good 
reasons whv. sometimes. comparable independent companies no longer exist
Quite obviously, the whole issue of how to apply the arm's length Standard is aggravated 
in situations where no comparable independent transactions exist. Multinational 
enterprises have developed for good reasons. Intemalizing market failure is one such 
reason. Independent manufacturers wili not be willing to exclusively produce components 
for another and let us assume much larger manufacturer, if these components are unique 
and cannot be used by any other potential buyer and if they require substantial Capital 
investment. In such a case the manufacturer is at the complete mercy of the buyer. In fact, 
this is historically the reason why the stamping of sheet metal in automotive 
manufacturing is typically carried out by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) 
themselves and not by independent firms. From a transfer pricing perspective, it now 
becomes unavoidable to look outside the industry or even the country of the tested party 
to find independent comparable transactions.
Do all methods complv with the arm 's length Standard?
I want to make absolutely clear that I do not advocate to abandon the arm's length 
Standard. It is a practical and by and large fair approach to the complex economic 
problems posed in international transfer pricing. In the discussions that have led up to 
today's status of the tax regulations in the OECD and in its member countries, substantial 
progress has been made on the conceptual and the practical side.
However, as you have seen, the arm's length Standard has some inherent problems 
because of the massive structural differences between the dealings of independent 
companies and the dealings within a multinational enterprise. My personal conclusion so 
far is, as a practitioner and an economist, that the implicit use of price formations that are 
based on supply and demand functions is not entirely appropriate. I believe that
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bargaining models should complement today's economic thinking in international 
transfer pricing, because they more appropriately capture the bilateral monopoly situation 
of the affiliated buyer and supplier within a multinational enterprise.
Accepting the arm's length Standard as a starting point, the question arises whether the 
transfer pricing methods together with their assumed underlying price formation 
mechanism suggested in the OECD Guidelines and the various national regulations 
actually meet this Standard. For those methods that directly compare the tested party with 
independent comparable companies and the transactions between them, this question is 
less critical. However, we have touched on issues of how to allocate economies of 
integration, how to deal with inefficiencies, or how to properly interpret the “as-actually- 
structured” principle. When discussing the profit split method, this issue became more 
crucial because of the open question of whether the profit split method describes an 
economically sound price formation mechanism. When looking at cost sharing as a 
transfer pricing method for transferring intangible property, the economic assessment of 
the arm's length nature of the method leads to serious concerns. In fact it tums out that 
independent companies typically would not choose cost sharing. To put it differently, 
cost sharing as a method does not seem to comply with the arm's length Standard.
In a cost sharing agreement two or more parties share the costs and the ex ante risk of 
research and development activities. For transfer pricing purposes one has to determine 
the respective cost shares. The US Regulations, for example, determine that the cost 
shares be proportionate to the anticipated benefits, i.e. profits, each cost sharing partner 
would receive from a successfiil development. To exemplify the situation, consider two 
manufacturing operations that share the cost of a new product development. The actual 
R&D effort is carried out by one of them. If the development is successful, they both 
produce and sell the new product in their respective markets. If one company eams a 
profit of 80 and the other a profit of 120 they would share the R&D cost 40:60. This is 
the so-called “commensurate with income Standard”. Referring back to the discussion 
about bargaining models, it is difficult to envisage that independent firms would negotiate
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such shares. The expected outcome from the Standard models is a 50:50 split o f the entire 
Consolidated profit.
But beyond that there is also a more important consideration. Independent parties could 
choose between cost sharing and licensing. Obviously licensing would only occur after 
the R&D effort and only if it had been successful. This timing difference is crucial when 
investigating subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. Adhering to the commensurate with 
income Standard the company carrying out the R&D has to offer a cost sharing agreement 
which shares the cost in proportion to the respective expected profits. It would only be 
optimal to do so if the cost share exceeds the expected license income in case the product 
development is successful. For the same token for the other company the expected profit 
under cost sharing is smaller than the expected profit under licensing. It will therefore 
decline the cost sharing offer and wait for the second stage and then accept the license 
offer. On the other hand, if the cost share received is lower than the expected license 
income, then the company carrying out the R&D will not offer the cost sharing in the first 
place. This shows that cost sharing under the commensurate with income Standard cannot 
be a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. The same applies to any predetermined cost 
sharing rule. If  no restrictions were imposed on the cost sharing agreements, then risk 
neutral companies would agree on cost shares that give the same expected outcome as 
under licensing, It can be shown easily that situations arise where such a negotiated cost 
share to be paid by the non-developer exceeds the entire R&D cost. It not longer seems 
appropriate to call this cost sharing, because the non-developer takes over the entire cost 
and the ex ante risk.
Whereas some forms o f the profit split contain elements of outside evidence, cost sharing 
is based on a purely intemal view of the multinational enterprise. This might be why the 
political debate on cost sharing has taken so long. The severe conceptual problems 
outlined above are mitigated by substantial practical advantages. Having dealt with both 
cost sharing systems and license arrangements, cost sharing avoids the very difficult 
valuation problems in licensing. Unfortunately it also creates buy-in and buy-out
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problems. This refers to situations where, for example, one manufacturer has become the 
economic owner o f a certain product intangible but where the multinational enterprise 
decides to shift production to another location. Therefore, although it is the economic 
owner of the intangible, someone else exploits the intangible and the ownership of the 
intangible should be transferred at a certain price to the new manufacturer.
This is a very good example of the tension between an economically sound and a 
practical approach. Economics and business management can provide guidance on 
conceptual issues, practitioners can provide guidance on applicability, but in the end it is 
a political task to strike the balance.
International transfer pricing is an excellent topic for multidisciplinary and hands 
on teaching and also for research
From the many examples and arguments that I have presented above, you can easily 
gather that international transfer pricing is also a reach field for teaching. In my view, it 
provides a unique basis to combine theory and practice in teaching economics and 
business administration. It comprises elements of the theory of firms, financial analyses 
and cost accounting, benchmarking, statistical analyses, and economic models on price 
setting, bargaining and Capital asset pricing. Last but not least tax law and tax regulations 
have to be interpreted.
To obtain a better understanding of the arm's length Standard, it is important to 
understand why multinational enterprises exist. Some of these reasons have direct 
implications for the application of the arm's length Standard. In cases where multinational 
enterprises overcome market failures or exploit benefits of vertical integration, it is often 
the case that directly comparable transactions between independent parties simply do not 
exist.
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By becoming more familiar with transfer pricing, students can better understand the 
importance of economies of scale for the concentration and the regional or global 
deployment of value added activities. The distribution of the value added activities in tum 
determines the intercompany transaction flows. The students also leam through financial 
simulations how multinational enterprises influence the distribution of profits amongst 
the entities through central product allocations to manufacturing units, decisions on 
capacity utilization, or allocation ofproduced goods to markets. This is even the case 
with an appropriate transfer pricing system.
The course provides insights into profit & loss and balance sheet analysis. Practical 
examples provide an introduction to the interpretation of profit & loss and balance sheet 
positions. The goal is, however, to develop an understanding of how to measure the 
profitability of firms and how to best compare them. One has to deal with the choice 
between various profit level indicators, for example return on sales or return on capital 
employed. This choice is driven by the value stage under consideration, for example the 
asset intensity o f the company. These issues have also been explored in a masters thesis.
Simple regression techniques are applied for comparability adjustments. As an example, 
used car price offerings in a newspaper and their dependence on the mileage o f the car 
and other car features are analyzed. This then allows the students to determine the price 
o f a car with specified features that is not included in the newspaper. They can compare 
the result of this approach with those of altemative approaches and critically assess the 
reliability of the methods.
The concept o f margin or profit drivers is introduced which is absolutely crucial for 
benchmarking. Thereby, a fïrst understanding of this important business management tooi 
is provided.
Price formation including bargaining approaches is discussed and how the transfer 
pricing guidelines and regulations interpret price formation. The various transfer pricing
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methods are introduced and compared. The rules of application are developed. This also 
covers licensing which is also important as a means of technology transfer between 
independent firms.
International transfer pricing provides interesting topics for master theses. In fact, 
students have written their master theses on cost sharing and licensing, profit level 
indicators, or have analyzed the profit split method.
Epilog
International transfer pricing is an interdisciplinary subject where economics and business 
administration provides conceptual guidance and practical interpretations of the law. 
Synergies between academics and practice, I believe, are worth exploiting.
I would like to thank the University of Maastricht, and in particular the Faculty of 
Economics and Business Administration, for providing me with the opportunity to teach 
here. It was quite natural for me, working as an economist in international transfer 
pricing, to choose this as the topic for a course in quantitative economics when I was 
asked to become a professor at the University of Maastricht. This initiative came from 
Franz Palm who was interested in a course that combines theoretical aspects in 
economics with real life applications. My name was mentioned by Martin Hellwig, with 
whom I had written my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Bonn. As a result of these 
fortunate coincidences, I have been giving courses on international transfer pricing for 
four years now.
During this time, other forms of cooperation arose. For example, I had the opportunity to 
lecture in seminars together with Anton Daniels from the Faculty of Law. This gives you 
a clear indication that international transfer pricing is an interdisciplinary subject and I 
hope that more opportunities for interdisciplinary work and cooperation will emerge.
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At this point, I would also like to add a word of thanks to my employing company,
A.T. Keamey, and my family. Without their consent and support, I would not be able to 
teach on transfer pricing here at the University. I also would like to thank Hans Peters for 
his support and friendship.
Dealing with international transfer pricing is hard work, brain work and also fun. I hope 
that now, after my speech, you share my interest in this subject.
Thank you for your attention.
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